The global economy is once again on edge, this time with eyes turning towards the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical maritime chokepoint that could rival the impact of the Strait of Hormuz in terms of potential disruption. While the world grapples with the implications of the Strait of Hormuz’s vulnerability, analysts are flagging the Bab el-Mandeb as the next potential flashpoint, particularly in light of recent escalations involving the Houthi movement in Yemen.
The Houthis, an influential military faction controlling significant portions of northern Yemen and aligned with Iran, have recently entered the fray by launching missiles towards Israel for the first time since the ongoing conflict began. This development, occurring on March 28, places Yemen on one side of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and amplifies concerns about its strategic importance. The Houthis have a documented history of targeting shipping in the Red Sea, having already caused considerable disruption in late 2023 and early 2024. Reports suggest that Iran has been in communication with the Houthis, encouraging them to prepare for a similar campaign of disruption. This situation brings renewed focus onto the Houthis, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Red Sea, raising questions about the potential global economic repercussions if this second major chokepoint were to be compromised.
Understanding the Bab el-Mandeb Strait
The Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a vital maritime passage, is approximately 30 kilometres wide at its narrowest point. It forms a crucial link between the Arabian Peninsula, specifically Yemen to the northeast, and the African continent, with Eritrea and Djibouti to the west. The name itself, “Gate of Tears” in Arabic, hints at its historically challenging sailing conditions.
Its significance is amplified by its role, alongside the Suez Canal in Egypt, in facilitating direct transit between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Vessels navigate this route by passing through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. Prior to the opening of the Suez Canal in the 19th century, ships traversing between these two bodies of water were compelled to undertake the arduous journey around the southern tip of Africa.
The geographical advantage offered by the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is substantial. For instance, an oil tanker departing Saudi Arabia for the Netherlands would face a journey of approximately 12,000 kilometres via the Red Sea. This is a considerable reduction compared to the more than 20,000 kilometres required to circumnavigate Africa. This difference translates directly into significant time savings. Data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) indicates that a voyage between the Arabian Sea and the Netherlands, which takes 34 days when routed around Africa, can be completed in just 19 days by utilising the Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal.
The Flow of Global Trade Through the Strait
Under normal circumstances, a substantial portion of global maritime trade, estimated at up to 14%, transits through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. While precise, granular data on the specific commodities passing through this strait is somewhat limited, fossil fuels represent a significant component of this traffic.
The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that by 2025, an estimated 4.2 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum liquids will pass through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait daily. This figure represents approximately 5% of global oil production.
To gain a more detailed understanding of the types of goods utilising this route, official data from the Suez Canal Authority, which is intrinsically linked to Red Sea shipping, provides valuable insights. During the final quarter of 2025, approximately 40% of the 3,426 vessels that transited the Suez Canal were carrying fossil fuels. This included 1,330 oil tankers and 88 liquefied natural gas (LNG) ships.
Beyond energy products, bulk and general cargo vessels constituted another significant segment, making up 40% of the traffic (1,339 ships). These vessels typically transport agricultural commodities such as corn, wheat, and soybeans, as well as essential raw materials like coal and iron ore. Container ships accounted for about 13% of the total traffic, with 459 vessels recorded.
It is important to note that overall traffic through the Red Sea has experienced a considerable decline since the Houthi attacks on shipping commenced in late 2023 and continued into 2024, even though the frequency of these attacks has largely subsided.
The Potential for Disruption: Can the Strait Be “Closed”?
While the term “closed” might be used, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait cannot be entirely shut off in a physical sense. Its narrowest point still represents a considerably wide waterway. Furthermore, unlike the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb is not a “cul-de-sac” with a single point of egress. Ships can still proceed to the Mediterranean Sea via the Suez Canal.
However, this alternative route offers little solace to vessels destined for Asia, which would then be forced to undertake the lengthy voyage around Africa, adding weeks to their transit times.
In response to previous security concerns, Saudi Arabia had already established a contingency plan, known as the East-West pipeline, to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. This pipeline connects Abqaiq in the north to Yanbu on the Red Sea and had already begun operating at near full capacity in response to regional conflicts. Nevertheless, oil intended for Asian markets originating from this new exit point still requires passage through the Bab el-Mandeb to avoid the extended African route, making it susceptible to disruption.
Lessons from Past Crises
To comprehend the potential impact of Houthi actions on shipping, it is instructive to examine the recent Red Sea crisis. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a total of 67 incidents were recorded between November 2023 and September 2024. While some vessels sustained only minor equipment damage, others endured severe fires, flooding, and structural damage as a result of missile or drone strikes.
Although there have been relatively few attacks since early 2024, and the strait was never completely “closed” in absolute terms with some ships continuing to navigate it throughout the crisis, the threat alone has had significant consequences.
The Persistent Threat: Beyond Direct Attacks
The tactics employed by the Houthis in previous disruptions are likely to be replicated. However, for shipping companies, the mere prospect of attacks can be sufficient to cause a slowdown or restriction of maritime traffic. The risks to civilian crews are substantial, with direct threats to life.
Adding to these concerns are the escalating insurance costs. In 2024, insurance premiums typically hovered around 0.6% of a ship’s cargo value. Following the Red Sea crisis, these costs surged, reaching as high as 2% in some instances.
The simultaneous effective closure of both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would undoubtedly trigger severe disruptions to global supply chains and the worldwide economy, presenting a formidable challenge to international commerce.
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